

Interactive protocols & zero-knowledge

- interactive protocols formalize what can be recognized by polynomial time restricted verifiers in arbitrary protocols
- generalizes NP
- zero-knowledge formalizes that verifiers learn nothing beyond recognizing language.

Class NP and verifiers

Definition 3.6 A verifier V for language $L \subseteq \Sigma^*$ is a computable function $V : \Sigma^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ such that

$$L = \left\{ w \in \Sigma^* \mid \exists c \in \{0,1\}^* : V(w, c) = 1 \right\}.$$


Definition 3.7 V is a polynomial verifier for language $L \subseteq \Sigma^*$ if V is a verifier for L and

1. the running time of V on input (w, c) is polynomial in $|w|$,
2. there is a polynomial $p: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $w \in L$ there is a $c \in \{0,1\}^{p(|w|)}$ with $V(w, c) = 1$.

If language L has a polynomial verifier we call it polynomially verifiable.


Class NP and verifiers

Theorem 3.8 A language L is in NP if and only if there is a polynomial verifier for L .



SAT and NP

SAT := $\{\varphi \mid \varphi \text{ is a satisfiable Boolean formula}\}$



SAT \in NP.

Quadratic residues

Definition 3.9 Let $N \in \mathbb{N}$, then

$QR(N) := \{v \in \mathbb{Z}_N^* \mid \exists s \in \mathbb{Z}_N^* \ s^2 = v \pmod{N}\}$ is called the set of quadratic residues modulo N .

$QNR(N) := \mathbb{Z}_N^* \setminus QR(N)$ is called the set of quadratic non-residues modulo N .

$$QR := \{(N, v) \mid v \in QR(N)\}$$

$$QNR := \{(N, v) \mid v \notin QR(N)\}$$

Property If $v \in QR(N)$ and $u \in QNR(N)$, then $v \cdot u \in QNR(N)$.

QR is in NP

Observation $QR \in NP$.

verifier



$$(N, v) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_N^*$$

prover



try s!



outputs 1, iff
 $s^2 = v \pmod N$

Quadratic non-residues and protocols

What about QNR and NP?

Don't know, but

verifier




$$(N, v) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_N^*$$

prover



$$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*,$$

$$y := r^2 \cdot v^b \pmod{N}$$



b'

outputs 1 iff $b = b'$

Quadratic non-residues and protocols

verifier




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$$y := r^2 \cdot v^b \pmod{N}$$



b'

outputs 1 iff $b = b'$

Properties

- If $(N, v) \in \text{QNR}$, then P can make V accept with prob. 1.
- If $(N, v) \in \text{QR}$, then no matter what P does, V accepts only with prob. $1/2$.

Interactive protocols

Interactive protocols

- use randomness
- use communication
- allow error in acceptance/rejection

Definition 3.10 A language L is in the class IP , if there are V, P and a protocol V/P with

1. for all $w \in L$ the verifier V outputs 1 with probability $\geq 2/3$ after execution of V/P with input w ,
2. for all $w \notin L$ and all provers P' the verifier outputs 1 with probability $\leq 1/3$ after execution of V/P' with P' and input w ,
3. the overall running time of V is polynomial.

Interactive protocols

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2. for all $w \notin L$ and all provers P' the verifier outputs 1 with probability $\leq 1/3$ after execution of V/P' with P' and input w ,
3. the overall running time of V is polynomial.

Remarks

- In protocol V/P' V behaves as in V/P , but P' may behave differently from P .
- May assume that format of message of P' is as in V/P .
- Constants $2/3$ and $1/3$ are arbitrary, $(1 + \epsilon)$ & $(1 - \epsilon)$ suffice.

QR, QNR and IP

Observation QR and QNR are in IP.

Theorem 3.11 $NP \subseteq IP$.

QR is in NP

Observation $QR \in NP$.

verifier



$$(N, v) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_N^*$$

prover




try s!



outputs 1, iff
 $s^2 = v \pmod N$

Fiat-Shamir revisited



Properties

- If $(N, v) \in \text{QR}$, then P can make V accept with prob. 1.
- If $(N, v) \in \text{QNR}$, then no matter what P' does, V accepts only with prob. $1/2$.

Fiat-Shamir revisited

1. For $i=1$ to l P/A and V/B do:

P/A

$$r_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*, x_i := r_i^2 \bmod N$$



V/B

$$b_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$



$$t_i := r_i \cdot s_A^{b_i} \bmod N$$



rejects if $t_i^2 \neq x_i \cdot v_A^{b_i} \bmod N$

2. V/B accepts.

Transcripts

Definition 3.11 Let L be a language, $v \in L$ and V/P be an interactive protocol for L . A transcript $\tau \in \{0,1\}^*$ of V/P on input v consists of v , the output and all messages exchanged between V and P . By $T_{V,P}(v)$ we denote the random variable corresponding to these transcripts, i.e. $\Pr[T_{V,P}(v) = \tau]$ denotes the probability that the transcript of V/P on input v is τ .

Remark Similarly for a probabilistic algorithm S we denote by $S(v)$ the random variable corresponding to the output of S on input v , i.e. by $\Pr[S(v) = \tau]$ we denote the probability that S on input v outputs τ .

Fiat-Shamir revisited

1. For $i=1$ to l P/A and V/B do:

P/A

$$r_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*, x_i := r_i^2 \bmod N$$



V/B

$$b_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$



$$t_i := r_i \cdot s_A^{b_i} \bmod N$$



rejects if $t_i^2 \neq x_i \cdot v_A^{b_i} \bmod N$

2. V/B accepts.

Zero-knowledge protocols

Definition 3.12 Let L be a language and V/P be an interactive protocol for L . Protocol V/P is called a (honest verifier) zero-knowledge protocol, if there is a ppt S such that for

all $v \in L$ and all $\tau \in \{0,1\}^*$

$$\Pr[T_{V,P}(v) = \tau] = \Pr[S(v) = \tau].$$

Remarks

- Definition only says something about $v \in L$.
- ppt verifier V learn nothing from execution of V/P since all it learns (=transcript) it can compute alone (via S).

Zero-knowledge protocols and Fiat-Shamir

Theorem 3.13 The Fiat-Shamir protocol is a zero-knowledge protocol for the language QR.

Fact Let $N \in \mathbb{N}$, then every element in $QR(N)$ has the same number of square roots modulo N , namely $|\mathbb{Z}_N^*|/|QR(N)|$.

Fiat-Shamir identification protocol

1. For $i=1$ to l P/A and V/B do:

P/A

$$r_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*, x_i := r_i^2 \bmod N$$



V/B

$$b_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$$



$$t_i := r_i \cdot s_A^{b_i} \bmod N$$



rejects if $t_i^2 \neq x_i \cdot v_A^{b_i} \bmod N$

2. B accepts.

Zero-knowledge protocols and Fiat-Shamir

Theorem 3.13 The Fiat-Shamir protocol is a zero-knowledge protocol for the language QR.

S on input $v \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$

- $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$
- $x := t^2 \cdot v^{-b} \pmod N$
- output $(v, x, b, t, 1)$

Zero-knowledge protocols and Fiat-Shamir

Theorem 3.13 The Fiat-Shamir protocol is a zero-knowledge protocol for the language QR.

Why is zero-knowledge possible?

- Protocol and simulator compute same transcripts, but in different order.
- In Fiat-Shamir, first compute square, then square root.
- In simulator, first compute root, then square it.
- Squaring is easy, taking square roots modulo N (probably) not.

Perfect zero-knowledge protocols

Definition 3.14 Let L be a language and V/P be an interactive protocol for L . Protocol V/P is called a perfect zero-knowledge protocol, if for all ppt verifiers V^* there is a ppt S^* such that for all $v \in L$ and all $\tau \in \{0,1\}^*$

1. with probability $\leq 1/2$ S^* output a special symbol \perp ,
2. $\Pr\left[T_{V^*,P}(v) = \tau\right] = \Pr\left[S^*(v) = \tau \mid S^*(v) \neq \perp\right]$.

Remarks

- In protocol V^*/P P behaves as in V/P , but V^* may behave differently from V .
- May assume that format of message of V^* is as in V/P .

Zero-knowledge protocols and Fiat-Shamir

Theorem 3.15 The Fiat-Shamir protocol is a perfect zero-knowledge protocol for the language QR.

S* on input $v \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$

- $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}, t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*, x := t^2 \cdot v^{-b} \pmod N$
- simulate V^* with input (v, N, x) , until V^* outputs a bit b' .
- if $b \neq b'$, output \perp , else output $(v, x, b, t, 1)$

Schnorr identification – setup

- TA** chooses primes p, q such that $q \mid p - 1$ and $q > 2^l$,
chooses generator z of \mathbb{Z}_p^* and sets $g := z^{p-1/q}$.
- A** chooses $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, sets $v_A := g^{-a} \bmod p$.
- TA** sets $\text{cert}(A) := (\text{id}(A), v_A, \text{Sign}_{\text{TA}}(\text{id}(A), v_A))$

Remark g has order q .

Schnorr identification protocol

A

$$k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q, x := g^k \text{ mod } p$$

cert(A), x
→

challenge

r
←

$$y := k - a \cdot r \text{ mod } q$$

y
→

response

B

verifies cert(A)

$$r \leftarrow \{1, \dots, 2^l\}$$

accepts iff

$$x = g^y \cdot v_A^r \text{ mod } p$$

Impersonation in Schnorr protocol

Theorem 3.16 For any $\delta \geq 2^{-l+2}$ and any algorithm C there exists an algorithm C' with the following properties:

1. If on input p, q, g, v_A C impersonates A with probability $\geq \delta$, then C' on input p, q, g, v_A computes a discrete logarithm of v_A to base g with probability 0.03;
2. If C runs in time T , then C' runs in time $\mathcal{O}(T/\delta + \log^2(p))$.

From C to C'

C' on input p, q, g, v_A

1. repeat at most $1/\delta$ – times

a) $z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^R, r \leftarrow \{1, \dots, 2^l\}$

b) simulate C with random bits z and r

c) if C succeeds set $r_1 := r$ and goto 2)

2. repeat at most $1/\delta$ – times

a) $r \leftarrow \{1, \dots, 2^l\}$

b) simulate C with random bits z and r

c) if C succeeds set $r_2 := r$ and goto 3)

3. if $r_1 \neq r_2$, output r_1, r_2 and corresponding y_1, y_2 .

Zero-knowledge protocols and Schnorr

Theorem 3.17 The Schnorr protocol is a zero-knowledge protocol.

Observations

- The Schnorr protocol is not known to be perfect zero-knowledge unless 2^l is small.
- No attacks against Schnorr protocol are known.

Okamoto protocol

- efficiency similar to Schnorr
- still not zero-knowledge
- but witness hiding